Security21(high6medium8)
System robot Project permissions limited to projects
highAffectssystem robot accounts configured with Cover all projects and a permission on the Project resource
Previously, these permissions could authorize actions on every resource inside every project, not just the projects themselves; this exposed those resources when the robot token was held by someone or something not fully trusted. After upgrading, access to repositories, artifacts, members, robot accounts, and other project resources requires specific resource permissions.
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- src/common/security/robot/context.go (+9 -0)
- src/common/security/robot/context_test.go (+56 -0)
- src/core/middlewares/middlewares.go (+2 -0)
* (high): Robot "cover all projects" scope collapses into a global wildcard, conferring the deliberately-ungrantable robot:update — enabling cross-project robot takeover with owner lockout [GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5) in [`7331b58d5`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/7331b58d594f245aaf7f70515473aedffff85499)
- ce7a28738b69 [cherry-pick] fix(rbac): stop cover-all robot scope from reaching sub-resources (GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5) (Vadim Bauer)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5Harbor registry API path traversal flaw fixed
highAffectsHarbor registry API (/v2/)
A crafted path containing . or .. could pass permission checks for an accessible repository, then operate on another repository after path resolution. Such requests now receive HTTP 400; normal Docker, containerd, Podman, and other OCI clients are unaffected because they do not send these paths.
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- src/server/middleware/regpath/regpath.go (+74 -0)
- src/server/middleware/regpath/regpath_test.go (+84 -0)
* (high): Path traversal vulnerability in distribution endpoints [GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc) in [`a82c5528f`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/a82c5528f1e939a78f2ce9acab9ecd03ee90b98f)
- f64ff7ec6f9e [cherry-pick] fix(registry): reject dot segments in /v2/ distribution paths (GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc) (Vadim Bauer)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5Auth-proxy registry API administrator access fixed
highAffectsHarbor deployments using auth_mode = http_auth with identity-provider usernames matching local Harbor system-administrator accounts
Before this release, an auth-proxy token for a matching username could get administrator access to /v2/ even when the proxy had not granted it. Now, registry API administrator access through the proxy comes only from the auth-proxy admin username or group settings; the Harbor UI and /api/v2.0 were not affected.
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- src/server/middleware/security/auth_proxy.go (+4 -0)
- src/server/middleware/security/auth_proxy_test.go (+44 -1)
* (high): External auth-proxy identity named admin inherits Registry system-administrator authorization [GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw) in [`13e5a1b97`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/13e5a1b979d90d346716c19eefc5f6cfa31dce0e)
- c1223fe7d071 [cherry-pick] fix(authproxy): clear leaked local sysadmin flag in http_auth /v2 context (GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw) (Vadim Bauer)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5Webhook and Slack delivery to non-public addresses blocked by default
highAffectsHTTP or Slack webhooks targeting private, loopback, link-local, or other non-public addresses, including hostnames that resolve to them
Previously, project administrators could configure these webhooks to reach internal services, and jobservice requests could expose parts of error responses in webhook execution logs. After upgrading, existing deliveries to those destinations fail and new webhooks are rejected; setting network.allow_private_network_access: true or HARBOR_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_ACCESS to true on both core and jobservice allows them again but disables the protection entirely.
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> [!WARNING]
> **Breaking change: webhooks to internal addresses are blocked by default**
> The fix for [GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w) blocks webhook and Slack delivery to private, loopback, link-local and other non-public addresses. That includes hostnames that resolve to them, such as `*.svc.cluster.local`. After you upgrade, existing webhooks to internal endpoints fail to deliver, and new ones are rejected.
> To allow them again, set the opt-out on **both core and jobservice**:
> - `harbor.yml`: `network.allow_private_network_access: true`, then `./prepare` and restart
> - Helm: add `{name: HARBOR_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_ACCESS, value: "true"}` to both `core.extraEnvVars` and `jobservice.extraEnvVars`
> This disables the protection entirely. Only use it if you trust all project admins, and block `169.254.169.254` at the network level.github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.14.5Webhook delivery to private, loopback and link-local addresses blocked
highAffectsHTTP or Slack webhooks targeting private, loopback or link-local addresses
Before the fix, project administrators could configure webhooks to these addresses; when an event triggered delivery, jobservice sent a POST from inside the deployment, and project members could see error responses in the execution log.
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* (medium): SSRF in webhook delivery allows ProjectAdmin to reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints [GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w) in [`fb476e10c`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/fb476e10c9f981bd994011563bef6c5292ec272c)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.14.5Harbor system administrator flag changes restricted to administrators
highAffectssystem robot accounts with the User: Update permission and tokens held by someone or something not fully trusted
Before this release, a system robot with User: Update could grant or remove the system administrator flag on any Harbor user. Now only system administrators can make those changes; robot requests receive HTTP 403, while their other user-update operations remain unchanged.
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- src/server/v2.0/handler/user.go (+7 -0)
- src/server/v2.0/handler/user_test.go (+22 -0)
* (high): A system robot with user:update makes itself a system administrator [GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2) in [`8896be0ae`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/8896be0aed0dbbd2b59d1524b748b4699e823c39)
- 3329f7f39161 [cherry-pick] fix(users): require sysadmin identity for grants (GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2) (Vadim Bauer)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5User-Agent bypass for image policies removed
mediumAffectsprojects enforcing Content trust or Prevent vulnerable images from running
Previously, a user or robot with push permission could set a User-Agent containing cosign or notation to pull unsigned or vulnerable images despite either policy; pull-only accounts were not affected. Neither policy now has that exemption by default, and cosign sign and notation sign fail with 412 Precondition Failed on a new unsigned image in a Content trust project; setting CONTENT_TRUST_LEGACY_SIGNER_PULL_ENABLED=true on core restores the exemption for Content trust only, for push-permission clients with a matching User-Agent.
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> [!WARNING]
> **Breaking change: signing unsigned images fails when content trust is enforced**
>
> The fix for [GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23) removes the User-Agent based exemption that let `cosign` and `notation` pull unsigned images. In projects that only allow signed images, `cosign sign` and `notation sign` on a new, unsigned image now fail with `412 Precondition Failed`. Images that already have a signature are not affected.
>
> To allow signing clients again, set `CONTENT_TRUST_LEGACY_SIGNER_PULL_ENABLED=true` on **core**. The value must be exactly `true`.
> - Helm: add it to `core.extraEnvVars`
> - `harbor.yml` installs: there is no `harbor.yml` option. Add it to `common/config/core/env` and restart. Re-running `./prepare` overwrites that file.
>
> The exemption still trusts the client's User-Agent, but only for users or robots with push permission on the project. Projects that block vulnerable images have no opt-out: a signing client can no longer pull an image that the vulnerability policy blocks.
* (medium): Vulnerability & Content-Trust pull policies bypassable via attacker-controlled `User-Agent` header [GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23) in [`9d255ebe1`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/9d255ebe1ad3cae00929af2f8100cec566d9ee97)
- 882d06c14b47 [cherry-pick] fix(policy): stop User-Agent from bypassing content-trust and vulnerability policies (GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23) (Vadim Bauer)
- src/server/middleware/contenttrust/contentrust.go (+11 -0)
- src/server/middleware/contenttrust/contentrust_test.go (+71 -3)
- src/server/middleware/vulnerable/vulnerable_test.go (+26 -0)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.14.5Registry upload redirect validation fixed
mediumAffectspush replication to registries that hand uploads off to a different hostname
Additional actionThe Harbor endpoint URL for a destination that hands uploads off to another hostname must use that hostname for the upload location to be accepted.
A tampered response from an untrusted or compromised registry, or one reached over plain HTTP or without certificate verification, could direct Harbor to send the blob and its registry Authorization header to another host. The fix rejects upload Location headers pointing to a different host, so replication fails for affected registries, including AWS ECR.
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> [!WARNING]
> **Known Issue: Push Replication Fails for Specific Registries such as AWS ECR (GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6 Regression)**
>
> The security fix for GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6 strictly validated upload Location headers against the statically configured registry endpoint (c.url). Because the AWS ECR adapter configures the API control-plane endpoint (https://api.ecr.<region>.amazonaws.com) while requests are rewritten to the data-plane host (<account>.dkr.ecr.<region>.amazonaws.com), ECR's response Location header is rejected as a cross-origin target.
>
>Workaround / Resolution:
>
> A fix has been provided in PR [#24113](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/pull/24113) and will be released in the upcoming patch release.
> If your environment depends on push replication, we recommend postponing the upgrade until the next patch release or applying the patch directly.
* (medium): Registry chunk upload reuses unvalidated Location headers [GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6) in [`401e73429`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/401e7342963c4c406fd103cf2931e8aac95d320d)
- e3cc29d8c40f [cherry-pick] fix(registry): validate chunk-upload Location against the registry origin (GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6) (Vadim Bauer)
- src/server/middleware/util/util.go (+42 -8)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.14.5Harbor now enforces all immutable tag selectors
mediumAffectsimmutable tag rules with multiple repository or tag selectors
Previously, Harbor checked only the first repository and tag patterns, leaving tags matched by later patterns mutable and open to overwrite or deletion. Those tags are now protected: overwrite pushes and deletion attempts are rejected.
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* (medium): Immutable tag rule matcher only evaluates first repository/tag selector, allowing multi-selector rules to be bypassed [GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg) in [`08c58f3c7`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/08c58f3c76bd8e9252996a3cc62dade10d4e3ab4)
- f4071e7cf9ab [cherry-pick] fix(immutable): evaluate all repository and tag selectors (GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg) (Vadim Bauer)
- src/pkg/immutable/match/rule/match.go (+77 -22)
- src/pkg/immutable/match/rule/match_test.go (+268 -0)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.14.5Jobservice webhook error-body memory exhaustion fixed
mediumAffectsHarbor installations using webhooks
When a webhook receiver returned an error, Jobservice read the entire response into the execution log without a size limit and decompressed gzip responses, allowing a receiver set by a not-fully-trusted project admin to cause high memory use and delayed or failed jobs. Failed response bodies are no longer logged; at most 64 KiB is discarded and only the status code is logged, and receiver redirects are no longer followed, so 3xx responses fail delivery.
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* (medium): Webhook error responses can cause unbounded decompression in Jobservice [GHSA-jw3v-7jvc-pfmx](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-jw3v-7jvc-pfmx) in [`fb476e10c`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/fb476e10c9f981bd994011563bef6c5292ec272c)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.14.5Scanner credential filter exposure fixed
mediumAffectsauthenticated scanner registrations with credentials still stored in plain text
Additional actionNo configuration change is needed.
Before the fix, callers with access to the project-level scanner-candidates endpoint could use access_cred as a filter to infer a stored credential one character at a time. The filter is no longer accepted, and scanning behaves as before.
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- f400b5459f5b [cherry-pick] fix(scanner): stop access_cred ORM filter oracle (GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr) (Vadim Bauer)
* (medium): scanner_registration.access_cred is missing filter:"false", giving a project admin a blind oracle over the scanner credential [GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr) in [`d2e2312f5`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/d2e2312f5735777b37041674bb146bcbd02fc054)
- src/pkg/scan/dao/scanner/model.go (+7 -2)
- src/pkg/scan/dao/scanner/registration_test.go (+52 -0)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5Bearer-auth scan token requests now verify core certificates
mediumAffectsscan jobs using scanners with bearer authorization
When jobservice requests a short-lived registry token from core for a scan, the request previously skipped certificate verification and had no response-size limit or timeout. It now verifies core's certificate using the internal TLS configuration, caps the response at 1 MiB, and times out after 30 seconds; scans can fail if jobservice does not trust the certificate presented at core_url.
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- 49c58b6c583c [cherry-pick] fix(scan): verify TLS and bound body on scanner bearer token request (GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4) (Vadim Bauer)
* (medium): Scanner bearer authorization request disables TLS verification and reads the full response body [GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4) in [`eb1a6fb64`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/eb1a6fb6424d523213eeac1faffd938cc687f2af)
- src/pkg/scan/job.go (+19 -2)
- src/pkg/scan/job_bearer_tls_test.go (+70 -0)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5Remote-registry pagination link origin check added
mediumAffectsremote-registry replication listings
Previously, replication followed a remote registry’s Link next URL without checking its origin and sent stored credentials with the request. Now, a next URL with a different scheme, host or port, or one containing a username, stops the listing with an error and fails the replication execution.
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- src/common/http/client.go (+58 -4)
- src/common/http/client_test.go (+176 -0)
* (medium): SSRF and credential disclosure via attacker-controlled pagination Link header in the registry replication client [GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2) in [`a01e0c6c5`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/a01e0c6c561458fc719a16310d02b928a87e589a)
- 1e8281bd1fe5 [cherry-pick] fix(common/http): constrain pagination Link next URL to the request origin (GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2) (Vadim Bauer)
- src/pkg/registry/client.go (+95 -25)
- src/pkg/registry/pagination_test.go (+154 -0)
- src/server/middleware/util/util.go (+42 -8)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5Remote registry upload Location validation added
mediumAffectspush-based replication to remote registries, with or without Copy by chunk, when destinations are not fully controlled, may be compromised, use plain http, or lack certificate verification
Previously, Harbor sent blob content and its Authorization header to a remote registry’s returned upload Location without checking that it pointed to the same registry. It now rejects locations with a different scheme, host, or port, or a username, and fails the replication task; relative locations, including those used with relativeurls behind a path prefix, still work.
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- src/pkg/registry/client.go (+95 -25)
- src/pkg/registry/client_chunk_location_test.go (+158 -0)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5Harbor core authentication-mode failure handling fixed
AffectsHarbor core's configured authentication mode
Additional actionNothing to configure or check is needed.
During a database or configuration-cache outage, core previously logged a warning and continued without an authentication mode; OIDC and auth-proxy login were skipped, while password login failed, leaving affected requests unauthenticated. After the upgrade, these requests receive HTTP 500 instead of continuing.
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- src/server/middleware/security/security.go (+10 -4)
- src/server/middleware/security/security_failclosed_test.go (+70 -0)
- src/server/middleware/security/security_test.go (+7 -0)
* (low): Security middleware continues after AuthMode lookup failure [GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6) in [`bfd319a92`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/bfd319a928460e50ad8f0536b5e163cefb24ef5c)
- a8ae8cef8101 [cherry-pick] fix(security): fail closed when auth mode lookup fails (GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6) (Vadim Bauer)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5Webhook response-body reflection stopped
Affectswebhook handling that reflects response bodies(Inferred)
GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q
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- 89be7fc3a061 [cherry-pick] fix(webhook): block SSRF to private-network targets and stop reflecting response bodies (GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q) (Vadim Bauer)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5Redis base image pin updated to Redis 7.2.11
AffectsHarbor builds using the Redis base-image Dockerfile(Inferred)
The previous 7.2.6-5.ph5 build did not include the Redis fix.
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* fix: pin redis 7.2.11 instead of 7.2.6 in the redis base image by @bupd in https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/pull/24065
- 5d4a83fc6f97 fix: pin redis 7.2.11 instead of 7.2.6 in the redis base image (#24065) (Prasanth Baskar)
- make/photon/redis/Dockerfile.base (+7 -2)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.14.5Private-network targets blocked for Harbor webhooks
AffectsHarbor webhook integrations with private-network targets
GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q
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- src/common/http/private_network.go (+287 -0)
- src/common/http/private_network_test.go (+272 -0)
- 89be7fc3a061 [cherry-pick] fix(webhook): block SSRF to private-network targets and stop reflecting response bodies (GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q) (Vadim Bauer)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5Private-network SSRF blocked in Harbor notifications
AffectsHarbor Slack and webhook notification jobs(Inferred)
The shared HTTP helper also stops reflecting response bodies.
GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q
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- src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/http_helper.go (+30 -4)
- src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/slack_job.go (+2 -7)
- src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/slack_job_test.go (+1 -0)
- src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/ssrf_test.go (+180 -0)
- src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/webhook_job.go (+2 -7)
- src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/webhook_job_test.go (+1 -0)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5Harbor notification jobs no longer reflect response bodies
AffectsHarbor Slack or webhook notification jobs(Inferred)
GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q
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- src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/http_helper.go (+30 -4)
- src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/slack_job.go (+2 -7)
- src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/slack_job_test.go (+1 -0)
- src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/ssrf_test.go (+180 -0)
- src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/webhook_job.go (+2 -7)
- src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/webhook_job_test.go (+1 -0)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5Harbor webhook SSRF blocking and response-body reflection fix
AffectsHarbor webhook handler setups(Inferred)
The handler blocks SSRF to private-network targets and no longer reflects response bodies.
GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q
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- src/server/v2.0/handler/webhook.go (+43 -9)
- src/server/v2.0/handler/webhook_test.go (+42 -5)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5