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Harborv2.13.6

Security 13Dependency updates 1

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Known issues1
Push replication fails with some registriesFixed in v2.14.6

These registries return an upload Location that this release rejects as cross-origin, causing push replication to fail. The note identifies a fix for an upcoming patch.

> [!WARNING]
> **Known Issue: Push Replication Fails for Specific Registries such as AWS ECR (GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6 Regression)**
>
> The security fix for GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6 strictly validated upload Location headers against the statically configured registry endpoint (c.url). Because the AWS ECR adapter configures the API control-plane endpoint (https://api.ecr.<region>.amazonaws.com) while requests are rewritten to the data-plane host (<account>.dkr.ecr.<region>.amazonaws.com), ECR's response Location header is rejected as a cross-origin target.
>
>Workaround / Resolution:
>
> A fix has been provided in PR [#24113](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/pull/24113) and will be released in the upcoming patch release.
> If your environment depends on push replication, we recommend postponing the upgrade until the next patch release or applying the patch directly.
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

Security13high5medium7

Harbor rejects /v2/ requests with dot segments

high
AffectsHarbor /v2/ registry API

Before the fix, a crafted request with . or .. path segments could pass a permission check for one repository and then reach another: anyone could read manifests from any project without logging in if at least one project was public, and users with push access to one project could change or delete tags and manifests in other projects. These requests now receive HTTP 400.

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* (high): Path traversal vulnerability in distribution endpoints [GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc) in [`a82c5528f`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/a82c5528f1e939a78f2ce9acab9ecd03ee90b98f)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

System robot Project permissions limited to projects

high
Affectssystem robots with Cover all projects scope and a Project resource permission

Before this release, that permission could expose resources across projects: Project: Read could read resources, and Project: Delete could delete them. The risk mattered when the robot token was held by someone or something not fully trusted; after upgrading, access to repositories, artifacts, members, robot accounts and other in-project resources requires separate grants.

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* (high): Robot "cover all projects" scope collapses into a global wildcard, conferring the deliberately-ungrantable robot:update — enabling cross-project robot takeover with owner lockout [GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5) in [`7331b58d5`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/7331b58d594f245aaf7f70515473aedffff85499)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

Registry API administrator access now follows auth-proxy settings

high
AffectsHTTP auth-proxy deployments using auth_mode = http_auth
Additional actionhttp_authproxy_admin_usernames or http_authproxy_admin_groups entries for users or groups relying on Harbor UI administrator status for registry API access

When an auth-proxy token used a username matching a local Harbor system administrator, including admin, /v2/ requests could inherit administrator access even without admin rights from the proxy, allowing pulls, pushes, and deletes across projects. After the upgrade, a local Harbor administrator flag no longer grants administrator access to those requests; only the auth-proxy admin settings do.

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* (high): External auth-proxy identity named admin inherits Registry system-administrator authorization [GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw) in [`13e5a1b97`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/13e5a1b979d90d346716c19eefc5f6cfa31dce0e)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

Internal webhook and Slack delivery blocked by default

high
AffectsHarbor setups where users who are not fully trusted can become project admins and jobservice can reach internal services or cloud metadata targeted by webhook or Slack notifications

Before this release, a project admin could configure an HTTP or Slack webhook to an internal address; if jobservice could reach it and it returned an error, the response body was written to the webhook execution log. After upgrading, existing deliveries to internal endpoints fail and new ones are rejected by default; setting network.allow_private_network_access: true or HARBOR_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_ACCESS to "true" in both core.extraEnvVars and jobservice.extraEnvVars disables the protection, and should only be used if all project admins are trusted and 169.254.169.254 is blocked at the network level.

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> [!WARNING]
> **Breaking change: webhooks to internal addresses are blocked by default**
> The fix for [GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w) blocks webhook and Slack delivery to private, loopback, link-local and other non-public addresses. That includes hostnames that resolve to them, such as `*.svc.cluster.local`. After you upgrade, existing webhooks to internal endpoints fail to deliver, and new ones are rejected.
> To allow them again, set the opt-out on **both core and jobservice**:
> - `harbor.yml`: `network.allow_private_network_access: true`, then `./prepare` and restart
> - Helm: add `{name: HARBOR_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_ACCESS, value: "true"}` to both `core.extraEnvVars` and `jobservice.extraEnvVars`
> This disables the protection entirely. Only use it if you trust all project admins, and block `169.254.169.254` at the network level.
* (medium): SSRF in webhook delivery allows ProjectAdmin to reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints [GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w) in [`fb476e10c`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/fb476e10c9f981bd994011563bef6c5292ec272c)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

Harbor administrator-flag changes restricted to system administrators

high
Affectssystem robot accounts with the User: Update permission

When such a robot's token was held by someone or something not fully trusted, it could grant or remove system administrator status for any Harbor user. After the upgrade, those operations return HTTP 403, while the robot's other user-update operations remain unchanged.

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* (high): A system robot with user:update makes itself a system administrator [GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2) in [`8896be0ae`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/8896be0aed0dbbd2b59d1524b748b4699e823c39)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

Harbor removes User-Agent exemptions from image pull policies

medium
Affectsprojects enforcing Content trust or Prevent vulnerable images from running

Previously, users or robots with project push permission could use a cosign or notation User-Agent to pull images blocked by either policy. Those pulls are now blocked, so signing a new unsigned image in a Content trust project fails with 412 Precondition Failed, while already-signed images remain pullable; CONTENT_TRUST_LEGACY_SIGNER_PULL_ENABLED=true restores the exemption only for Content trust and push-permitted users or robots.

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> [!WARNING]
> **Breaking change: signing unsigned images fails when content trust is enforced**
>
> The fix for [GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23) removes the User-Agent based exemption that let `cosign` and `notation` pull unsigned images. In projects that only allow signed images, `cosign sign` and `notation sign` on a new, unsigned image now fail with `412 Precondition Failed`. Images that already have a signature are not affected.
>
> To allow signing clients again, set `CONTENT_TRUST_LEGACY_SIGNER_PULL_ENABLED=true` on **core**. The value must be exactly `true`.
> - Helm: add it to `core.extraEnvVars`
> - `harbor.yml` installs: there is no `harbor.yml` option. Add it to `common/config/core/env` and restart. Re-running `./prepare` overwrites that file.
>
> The exemption still trusts the client's User-Agent, but only for users or robots with push permission on the project. Projects that block vulnerable images have no opt-out: a signing client can no longer pull an image that the vulnerability policy blocks.
* (medium): Vulnerability & Content-Trust pull policies bypassable via attacker-controlled `User-Agent` header [GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23) in [`9d255ebe1`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/9d255ebe1ad3cae00929af2f8100cec566d9ee97)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

Multi-selector immutable tag rules enforced correctly

medium
Affectsprojects with immutable tag rules containing multiple repository or tag selectors

These rules previously checked only the first pattern of each type, leaving tags matched by later selectors mutable and open to overwrite or deletion. Later matches are now protected, and pushes that overwrite them or attempts to delete them are rejected.

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* (medium): Immutable tag rule matcher only evaluates first repository/tag selector, allowing multi-selector rules to be bypassed [GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg) in [`08c58f3c7`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/08c58f3c76bd8e9252996a3cc62dade10d4e3ab4)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

Scanner credential filter exposure fixed

medium
AffectsHarbor installations with authenticated scanner registrations

Repeated q filter queries could reveal the stored scanner credential one character at a time when an untrusted user could become a project admin; exposure also depended on whether the credential was recoverable as plain text. access_cred can no longer be used as a filter, and scanning behavior is unchanged.

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* (medium): scanner_registration.access_cred is missing filter:"false", giving a project admin a blind oracle over the scanner credential [GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr) in [`d2e2312f5`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/d2e2312f5735777b37041674bb146bcbd02fc054)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

Scanner bearer-token requests now verify TLS and limit responses

medium
Affectsscan jobs using scanners with bearer authorization, when core_url is HTTPS and jobservice-to-core traffic crosses an untrusted network

Previously, the token request skipped certificate checks, had no response-size limit or timeout, and could expose temporary scan credentials to interception or read an arbitrarily large response into memory. It now verifies core’s certificate, caps responses at 1 MiB, and times out after 30 seconds; an untrusted certificate can make scans fail with certificate errors.

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* (medium): Scanner bearer authorization request disables TLS verification and reads the full response body [GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4) in [`eb1a6fb64`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/eb1a6fb6424d523213eeac1faffd938cc687f2af)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

Jobservice webhook error handling fixed

medium
AffectsHarbor installations using webhooks

When a webhook receiver returned an error, jobservice read and transparently decompressed the entire response body into the execution log without a size limit, potentially causing high memory use that delayed or failed jobs. It now discards at most 64 KiB of failed-response bodies and logs only the status code; redirects are not followed, so 3xx responses are recorded as failed deliveries.

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* (medium): Webhook error responses can cause unbounded decompression in Jobservice [GHSA-jw3v-7jvc-pfmx](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-jw3v-7jvc-pfmx) in [`fb476e10c`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/fb476e10c9f981bd994011563bef6c5292ec272c)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

Unsafe registry upload Locations rejected

medium
Affectspush-based replication to remote registries
Additional actionFor destinations that hand uploads off to another hostname, the configured endpoint URL must use that hostname.

Before this release, Harbor used a remote registry’s upload Location without checking that it pointed back to the same registry, and sent blob data and the registry Authorization header there. Now, upload locations with a different scheme, host, or port, or with a username, are rejected and the replication task fails; relative locations still work.

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* (medium): Registry chunk upload reuses unvalidated Location headers [GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6) in [`401e73429`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/401e7342963c4c406fd103cf2931e8aac95d320d)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

Replication client rejects invalid pagination links

medium
Affectspull-based replication from remote registries that paginate repository or tag lists
Additional actionFor remote registries whose pagination links use a different hostname, the Harbor endpoint URL must use that hostname.

Previously, Harbor followed remote Link headers without checking their destination and sent stored registry credentials with the request. Now, a next link with a different scheme, host or port, or one containing a username, stops the listing with an error and fails replication.

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* (medium): SSRF and credential disclosure via attacker-controlled pagination Link header in the registry replication client [GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2) in [`a01e0c6c5`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/a01e0c6c561458fc719a16310d02b928a87e589a)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

Harbor security middleware now rejects requests when authentication-mode lookup fails

AffectsHarbor core's configured authentication mode

When core could not read the configured authentication mode, for example during a database or configuration cache outage, the middleware logged a warning and continued, leaving requests unauthenticated. Now those requests receive HTTP 500 (failed to determine authentication mode); normal requests are unchanged.

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* (low): Security middleware continues after AuthMode lookup failure [GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6) in [`bfd319a92`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/bfd319a928460e50ad8f0536b5e163cefb24ef5c)
github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6

Dependency updates1

    1 more, none mentioning security
    • * fix: pin redis 7.2.11 instead of 7.2.6 in the redis base image by @bupd in https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/pull/24066

    Summaries are produced by AI, so they can be wrong, and they are provided without warranty.