# Harbor v2.14.5

2026-10-06 · [Original release notes](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.14.5) · [Full summary](https://ratatosk.io/en/releases/harbor/v2.14.5)

Security 21 (high 6) · Breaking changes 1 · Important fixes 1 · Other changes 20

## Security (21)

### [high] System robot Project permissions limited to projects

- Affects: system robot accounts configured with Cover all projects and a permission on the Project resource
- [GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5)

Previously, these permissions could authorize actions on every resource inside every project, not just the projects themselves; this exposed those resources when the robot token was held by someone or something not fully trusted. After upgrading, access to repositories, artifacts, members, robot accounts, and other project resources requires specific resource permissions.

> - src/common/security/robot/context.go (+9 -0)
> - src/common/security/robot/context_test.go (+56 -0)
> - src/core/middlewares/middlewares.go (+2 -0)
> * (high): Robot "cover all projects" scope collapses into a global wildcard, conferring the deliberately-ungrantable robot:update — enabling cross-project robot takeover with owner lockout [GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5) in [`7331b58d5`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/7331b58d594f245aaf7f70515473aedffff85499)
> - ce7a28738b69 [cherry-pick] fix(rbac): stop cover-all robot scope from reaching sub-resources (GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5) (Vadim Bauer)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

### [high] Harbor registry API path traversal flaw fixed

- Affects: Harbor registry API (`/v2/`)
- [GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc)

A crafted path containing `.` or `..` could pass permission checks for an accessible repository, then operate on another repository after path resolution. Such requests now receive HTTP 400; normal Docker, containerd, Podman, and other OCI clients are unaffected because they do not send these paths.

> - src/server/middleware/regpath/regpath.go (+74 -0)
> - src/server/middleware/regpath/regpath_test.go (+84 -0)
> * (high): Path traversal vulnerability in distribution endpoints [GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc) in [`a82c5528f`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/a82c5528f1e939a78f2ce9acab9ecd03ee90b98f)
> - f64ff7ec6f9e [cherry-pick] fix(registry): reject dot segments in /v2/ distribution paths (GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc) (Vadim Bauer)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

### [high] Auth-proxy registry API administrator access fixed

- Affects: Harbor deployments using `auth_mode = http_auth` with identity-provider usernames matching local Harbor system-administrator accounts
- [GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw)

Before this release, an auth-proxy token for a matching username could get administrator access to `/v2/` even when the proxy had not granted it. Now, registry API administrator access through the proxy comes only from the auth-proxy admin username or group settings; the Harbor UI and `/api/v2.0` were not affected.

> - src/server/middleware/security/auth_proxy.go (+4 -0)
> - src/server/middleware/security/auth_proxy_test.go (+44 -1)
> * (high): External auth-proxy identity named admin inherits Registry system-administrator authorization [GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw) in [`13e5a1b97`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/13e5a1b979d90d346716c19eefc5f6cfa31dce0e)
> - c1223fe7d071 [cherry-pick] fix(authproxy): clear leaked local sysadmin flag in http_auth /v2 context (GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw) (Vadim Bauer)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

### [high] Webhook and Slack delivery to non-public addresses blocked by default

- Affects: HTTP or Slack webhooks targeting private, loopback, link-local, or other non-public addresses, including hostnames that resolve to them
- [GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w)

Previously, project administrators could configure these webhooks to reach internal services, and jobservice requests could expose parts of error responses in webhook execution logs. After upgrading, existing deliveries to those destinations fail and new webhooks are rejected; setting `network.allow_private_network_access: true` or `HARBOR_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_ACCESS` to `true` on both core and jobservice allows them again but disables the protection entirely.

> > [!WARNING]
> > **Breaking change: webhooks to internal addresses are blocked by default**
> > The fix for [GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w) blocks webhook and Slack delivery to private, loopback, link-local and other non-public addresses. That includes hostnames that resolve to them, such as `*.svc.cluster.local`. After you upgrade, existing webhooks to internal endpoints fail to deliver, and new ones are rejected.
> > To allow them again, set the opt-out on **both core and jobservice**:
> > - `harbor.yml`: `network.allow_private_network_access: true`, then `./prepare` and restart
> > - Helm: add `{name: HARBOR_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_ACCESS, value: "true"}` to both `core.extraEnvVars` and `jobservice.extraEnvVars`
> > This disables the protection entirely. Only use it if you trust all project admins, and block `169.254.169.254` at the network level.

### [high] Webhook delivery to private, loopback and link-local addresses blocked

- Affects: HTTP or Slack webhooks targeting private, loopback or link-local addresses
- [GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w)

Before the fix, project administrators could configure webhooks to these addresses; when an event triggered delivery, jobservice sent a POST from inside the deployment, and project members could see error responses in the execution log.

> * (medium): SSRF in webhook delivery allows ProjectAdmin to reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints [GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w) in [`fb476e10c`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/fb476e10c9f981bd994011563bef6c5292ec272c)

### [high] Harbor system administrator flag changes restricted to administrators

- Affects: system robot accounts with the `User: Update` permission and tokens held by someone or something not fully trusted
- [GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2)

Before this release, a system robot with `User: Update` could grant or remove the system administrator flag on any Harbor user. Now only system administrators can make those changes; robot requests receive HTTP 403, while their other user-update operations remain unchanged.

> - src/server/v2.0/handler/user.go (+7 -0)
> - src/server/v2.0/handler/user_test.go (+22 -0)
> * (high): A system robot with user:update makes itself a system administrator [GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2) in [`8896be0ae`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/8896be0aed0dbbd2b59d1524b748b4699e823c39)
> - 3329f7f39161 [cherry-pick] fix(users): require sysadmin identity for grants (GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2) (Vadim Bauer)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

### [medium] `User-Agent` bypass for image policies removed

- Affects: projects enforcing Content trust or Prevent vulnerable images from running
- [GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23)

Previously, a user or robot with push permission could set a `User-Agent` containing `cosign` or `notation` to pull unsigned or vulnerable images despite either policy; pull-only accounts were not affected. Neither policy now has that exemption by default, and `cosign sign` and `notation sign` fail with `412 Precondition Failed` on a new unsigned image in a Content trust project; setting `CONTENT_TRUST_LEGACY_SIGNER_PULL_ENABLED=true` on core restores the exemption for Content trust only, for push-permission clients with a matching `User-Agent`.

> > [!WARNING]
> > **Breaking change: signing unsigned images fails when content trust is enforced**
> >
> > The fix for [GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23) removes the User-Agent based exemption that let `cosign` and `notation` pull unsigned images. In projects that only allow signed images, `cosign sign` and `notation sign` on a new, unsigned image now fail with `412 Precondition Failed`. Images that already have a signature are not affected.
> >
> > To allow signing clients again, set `CONTENT_TRUST_LEGACY_SIGNER_PULL_ENABLED=true` on **core**. The value must be exactly `true`.
> > - Helm: add it to `core.extraEnvVars`
> > - `harbor.yml` installs: there is no `harbor.yml` option. Add it to `common/config/core/env` and restart. Re-running `./prepare` overwrites that file.
> >
> > The exemption still trusts the client's User-Agent, but only for users or robots with push permission on the project. Projects that block vulnerable images have no opt-out: a signing client can no longer pull an image that the vulnerability policy blocks.
> * (medium): Vulnerability & Content-Trust pull policies bypassable via attacker-controlled `User-Agent` header [GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23) in [`9d255ebe1`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/9d255ebe1ad3cae00929af2f8100cec566d9ee97)
> - 882d06c14b47 [cherry-pick] fix(policy): stop User-Agent from bypassing content-trust and vulnerability policies (GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23) (Vadim Bauer)
> - src/server/middleware/contenttrust/contentrust.go (+11 -0)
> - src/server/middleware/contenttrust/contentrust_test.go (+71 -3)
> - src/server/middleware/vulnerable/vulnerable_test.go (+26 -0)

### [medium] Registry upload redirect validation fixed

- Affects: push replication to registries that hand uploads off to a different hostname
- Additional action: The Harbor endpoint URL for a destination that hands uploads off to another hostname must use that hostname for the upload location to be accepted.
- [GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6)

A tampered response from an untrusted or compromised registry, or one reached over plain HTTP or without certificate verification, could direct Harbor to send the blob and its registry `Authorization` header to another host. The fix rejects upload `Location` headers pointing to a different host, so replication fails for affected registries, including AWS ECR.

> > [!WARNING]
> > **Known Issue: Push Replication Fails for Specific Registries such as AWS ECR (GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6 Regression)**
> >
> > The security fix for GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6 strictly validated upload Location headers against the statically configured registry endpoint (c.url). Because the AWS ECR adapter configures the API control-plane endpoint (https://api.ecr.<region>.amazonaws.com) while requests are rewritten to the data-plane host (<account>.dkr.ecr.<region>.amazonaws.com), ECR's response Location header is rejected as a cross-origin target.
> >
> >Workaround / Resolution:
> >
> > A fix has been provided in PR [#24113](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/pull/24113) and will be released in the upcoming patch release.
> > If your environment depends on push replication, we recommend postponing the upgrade until the next patch release or applying the patch directly.
> * (medium): Registry chunk upload reuses unvalidated Location headers [GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6) in [`401e73429`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/401e7342963c4c406fd103cf2931e8aac95d320d)
> - e3cc29d8c40f [cherry-pick] fix(registry): validate chunk-upload Location against the registry origin (GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6) (Vadim Bauer)
> - src/server/middleware/util/util.go (+42 -8)

### [medium] Harbor now enforces all immutable tag selectors

- Affects: immutable tag rules with multiple repository or tag selectors
- [GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg)

Previously, Harbor checked only the first repository and tag patterns, leaving tags matched by later patterns mutable and open to overwrite or deletion. Those tags are now protected: overwrite pushes and deletion attempts are rejected.

> * (medium): Immutable tag rule matcher only evaluates first repository/tag selector, allowing multi-selector rules to be bypassed [GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg) in [`08c58f3c7`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/08c58f3c76bd8e9252996a3cc62dade10d4e3ab4)
> - f4071e7cf9ab [cherry-pick] fix(immutable): evaluate all repository and tag selectors (GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg) (Vadim Bauer)
> - src/pkg/immutable/match/rule/match.go (+77 -22)
> - src/pkg/immutable/match/rule/match_test.go (+268 -0)

### [medium] Jobservice webhook error-body memory exhaustion fixed

- Affects: Harbor installations using webhooks
- [GHSA-jw3v-7jvc-pfmx](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-jw3v-7jvc-pfmx)

When a webhook receiver returned an error, Jobservice read the entire response into the execution log without a size limit and decompressed gzip responses, allowing a receiver set by a not-fully-trusted project admin to cause high memory use and delayed or failed jobs. Failed response bodies are no longer logged; at most 64 KiB is discarded and only the status code is logged, and receiver redirects are no longer followed, so 3xx responses fail delivery.

> * (medium): Webhook error responses can cause unbounded decompression in Jobservice [GHSA-jw3v-7jvc-pfmx](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-jw3v-7jvc-pfmx) in [`fb476e10c`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/fb476e10c9f981bd994011563bef6c5292ec272c)

### [medium] Scanner credential filter exposure fixed

- Affects: authenticated scanner registrations with credentials still stored in plain text
- Additional action: No configuration change is needed.
- [GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr)

Before the fix, callers with access to the project-level scanner-candidates endpoint could use `access_cred` as a filter to infer a stored credential one character at a time. The filter is no longer accepted, and scanning behaves as before.

> - f400b5459f5b [cherry-pick] fix(scanner): stop access_cred ORM filter oracle (GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr) (Vadim Bauer)
> * (medium): scanner_registration.access_cred is missing filter:"false", giving a project admin a blind oracle over the scanner credential [GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr) in [`d2e2312f5`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/d2e2312f5735777b37041674bb146bcbd02fc054)
> - src/pkg/scan/dao/scanner/model.go (+7 -2)
> - src/pkg/scan/dao/scanner/registration_test.go (+52 -0)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

### [medium] Bearer-auth scan token requests now verify core certificates

- Affects: scan jobs using scanners with bearer authorization
- [GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4)

When jobservice requests a short-lived registry token from core for a scan, the request previously skipped certificate verification and had no response-size limit or timeout. It now verifies core's certificate using the internal TLS configuration, caps the response at 1 MiB, and times out after 30 seconds; scans can fail if jobservice does not trust the certificate presented at `core_url`.

> - 49c58b6c583c [cherry-pick] fix(scan): verify TLS and bound body on scanner bearer token request (GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4) (Vadim Bauer)
> * (medium): Scanner bearer authorization request disables TLS verification and reads the full response body [GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4) in [`eb1a6fb64`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/eb1a6fb6424d523213eeac1faffd938cc687f2af)
> - src/pkg/scan/job.go (+19 -2)
> - src/pkg/scan/job_bearer_tls_test.go (+70 -0)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

### [medium] Remote-registry pagination link origin check added

- Affects: remote-registry replication listings
- [GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2)

Previously, replication followed a remote registry’s `Link` next URL without checking its origin and sent stored credentials with the request. Now, a next URL with a different scheme, host or port, or one containing a username, stops the listing with an error and fails the replication execution.

> - src/common/http/client.go (+58 -4)
> - src/common/http/client_test.go (+176 -0)
> * (medium): SSRF and credential disclosure via attacker-controlled pagination Link header in the registry replication client [GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2) in [`a01e0c6c5`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/a01e0c6c561458fc719a16310d02b928a87e589a)
> - 1e8281bd1fe5 [cherry-pick] fix(common/http): constrain pagination Link next URL to the request origin (GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2) (Vadim Bauer)
> - src/pkg/registry/client.go (+95 -25)
> - src/pkg/registry/pagination_test.go (+154 -0)
> - src/server/middleware/util/util.go (+42 -8)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

### [medium] Remote registry upload `Location` validation added

- Affects: push-based replication to remote registries, with or without Copy by chunk, when destinations are not fully controlled, may be compromised, use plain `http`, or lack certificate verification
- [GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6)

Previously, Harbor sent blob content and its `Authorization` header to a remote registry’s returned upload `Location` without checking that it pointed to the same registry. It now rejects locations with a different scheme, host, or port, or a username, and fails the replication task; relative locations, including those used with `relativeurls` behind a path prefix, still work.

> - src/pkg/registry/client.go (+95 -25)
> - src/pkg/registry/client_chunk_location_test.go (+158 -0)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

### Harbor core authentication-mode failure handling fixed

- Affects: Harbor core's configured authentication mode
- Additional action: Nothing to configure or check is needed.
- [GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6)

During a database or configuration-cache outage, core previously logged a warning and continued without an authentication mode; OIDC and auth-proxy login were skipped, while password login failed, leaving affected requests unauthenticated. After the upgrade, these requests receive HTTP 500 instead of continuing.

> - src/server/middleware/security/security.go (+10 -4)
> - src/server/middleware/security/security_failclosed_test.go (+70 -0)
> - src/server/middleware/security/security_test.go (+7 -0)
> * (low): Security middleware continues after AuthMode lookup failure [GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6) in [`bfd319a92`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/bfd319a928460e50ad8f0536b5e163cefb24ef5c)
> - a8ae8cef8101 [cherry-pick] fix(security): fail closed when auth mode lookup fails (GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6) (Vadim Bauer)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

### Webhook response-body reflection stopped

- Affects: webhook handling that reflects response bodies (Inferred)
- GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q

> - 89be7fc3a061 [cherry-pick] fix(webhook): block SSRF to private-network targets and stop reflecting response bodies (GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q) (Vadim Bauer)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

### Redis base image pin updated to Redis 7.2.11

- Affects: Harbor builds using the Redis base-image Dockerfile (Inferred)
- [CVE-2025-49844](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-49844)

The previous `7.2.6-5.ph5` build did not include the Redis fix.

> * fix: pin redis 7.2.11 instead of 7.2.6 in the redis base image by @bupd in https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/pull/24065
> - 5d4a83fc6f97 fix: pin redis 7.2.11 instead of 7.2.6 in the redis base image (#24065) (Prasanth Baskar)
> - make/photon/redis/Dockerfile.base (+7 -2)

### Private-network targets blocked for Harbor webhooks

- Affects: Harbor webhook integrations with private-network targets
- GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q

> - src/common/http/private_network.go (+287 -0)
> - src/common/http/private_network_test.go (+272 -0)
> - 89be7fc3a061 [cherry-pick] fix(webhook): block SSRF to private-network targets and stop reflecting response bodies (GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q) (Vadim Bauer)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

### Private-network SSRF blocked in Harbor notifications

- Affects: Harbor Slack and webhook notification jobs (Inferred)
- GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q

The shared HTTP helper also stops reflecting response bodies.

> - src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/http_helper.go (+30 -4)
> - src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/slack_job.go (+2 -7)
> - src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/slack_job_test.go (+1 -0)
> - src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/ssrf_test.go (+180 -0)
> - src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/webhook_job.go (+2 -7)
> - src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/webhook_job_test.go (+1 -0)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

### Harbor notification jobs no longer reflect response bodies

- Affects: Harbor Slack or webhook notification jobs (Inferred)
- GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q

> - src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/http_helper.go (+30 -4)
> - src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/slack_job.go (+2 -7)
> - src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/slack_job_test.go (+1 -0)
> - src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/ssrf_test.go (+180 -0)
> - src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/webhook_job.go (+2 -7)
> - src/jobservice/job/impl/notification/webhook_job_test.go (+1 -0)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

### Harbor webhook SSRF blocking and response-body reflection fix

- Affects: Harbor webhook handler setups (Inferred)
- GHSA-mxjq-7hr5-pq2q

The handler blocks SSRF to private-network targets and no longer reflects response bodies.

> - src/server/v2.0/handler/webhook.go (+43 -9)
> - src/server/v2.0/handler/webhook_test.go (+42 -5)

https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/compare/v2.14.4...v2.14.5

## Breaking changes (1)

### Harbor database base image no longer installs `net-tools`

- Affects: setups using Harbor’s database base image (Inferred)

The database base-image build failed because Photon had removed `net-tools` from its repository, breaking the image build and Git workflow. The build now installs `util-linux` without attempting to install `net-tools`.

Evidence: “remove install net-tools from db dockerfile.base as photon removed it from repo in recently. the failed installation of the package breaks build db base image and git workflow.” https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/pull/23268

> * [cherry-pick]remove install net-tools from db dockerfile as photon removed it by @jUDASmILE in https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/pull/23268
> - 86f6b52c0013 [cherry-pick]remove install net-tools from db dockerfile as photon removed it (#23268) (jUDASmILE)
> - make/photon/db/Dockerfile.base (+17 -3)

## Important fixes (1)

### Release-2.14.0 Photon base-image tag collision fixed

- Affects: Harbor base-image builds using `goharbor/photon:5.0`, including release-2.14.0 and `main` builds

If the release workflow pushed its amd64-only image while a `main` build was running, the arm64 job could pull it and fail with `InvalidBaseImagePlatform` or `exec format error`. Release-2.14.0 builds now use `goharbor/photon:5.0-v2.14`, leaving the shared `goharbor/photon:5.0` tag untouched.

> * fix: stop release-2.14 builds from overwriting goharbor/photon:5.0 by @bupd in https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/pull/24063

## Other changes (20)

- Configurable generator JAR URL for `make swagger_client`
- Harbor base-image builds now use current Photon snapshots
- Cosign signing check in the test utility disables transparency-log uploads
- Test utility Cosign verification ignores the transparency log for signed artifacts
- Configurable `PIP_INDEX_URL` for Swagger client builds and test scripts
- Configurable OpenAPI generator CLI download URL for `swagger_client` builds
- Conditional `PIP_INDEX_URL` pass-through added to `swagger_client` build and test tooling
- Cosign test helper disables transparency-log upload for signing checks
- Cosign test helper passes `--insecure-ignore-tlog=true` to verification checks
- Registry source tag pinned and PostgreSQL 14 installation fixed
- Harbor Redis base-image build uses a pinned package from an unpinned Photon snapshot
- Harbor version bumped to `v2.14.5`
- `release-2.14.0` build workflow and Photon base-image Dockerfiles use a dedicated Photon tag
- Harbor base-image Dockerfiles switch to a version-specific Photon tag
- Makefile `swagger_client` target uses a configurable generator URL
- swagger-client build passes `PIP_INDEX_URL` to pip
- Harbor component base-image Dockerfiles use a release-specific Photon tag
- API test utility file updated
- Cosign test utility file updated
- Group 3 upgrade test script updated

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Summaries are produced by AI, so they can be wrong, and they are provided without warranty.
