# Harbor v2.13.6

2026-10-06 · [Original release notes](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.13.6) · [Full summary](https://ratatosk.io/en/releases/harbor/v2.13.6)

Security 13 (high 5) · Dependency updates 1

## Check before upgrading

### Known issues

- **Push replication fails with some registries** · Fixed in v2.14.6: These registries return an upload `Location` that this release rejects as cross-origin, causing push replication to fail. The note identifies a fix for an upcoming patch.
  > > [!WARNING]
  > > **Known Issue: Push Replication Fails for Specific Registries such as AWS ECR (GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6 Regression)**
  > >
  > > The security fix for GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6 strictly validated upload Location headers against the statically configured registry endpoint (c.url). Because the AWS ECR adapter configures the API control-plane endpoint (https://api.ecr.<region>.amazonaws.com) while requests are rewritten to the data-plane host (<account>.dkr.ecr.<region>.amazonaws.com), ECR's response Location header is rejected as a cross-origin target.
  > >
  > >Workaround / Resolution:
  > >
  > > A fix has been provided in PR [#24113](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/pull/24113) and will be released in the upcoming patch release.
  > > If your environment depends on push replication, we recommend postponing the upgrade until the next patch release or applying the patch directly.

## Security (13)

### [high] Harbor rejects `/v2/` requests with dot segments

- Affects: Harbor `/v2/` registry API
- [GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc)

Before the fix, a crafted request with `.` or `..` path segments could pass a permission check for one repository and then reach another: anyone could read manifests from any project without logging in if at least one project was public, and users with push access to one project could change or delete tags and manifests in other projects. These requests now receive HTTP 400.

> * (high): Path traversal vulnerability in distribution endpoints [GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-qj39-pjf2-wmrc) in [`a82c5528f`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/a82c5528f1e939a78f2ce9acab9ecd03ee90b98f)

### [high] System robot `Project` permissions limited to projects

- Affects: system robots with `Cover all projects` scope and a `Project` resource permission
- [GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5)

Before this release, that permission could expose resources across projects: `Project: Read` could read resources, and `Project: Delete` could delete them. The risk mattered when the robot token was held by someone or something not fully trusted; after upgrading, access to repositories, artifacts, members, robot accounts and other in-project resources requires separate grants.

> * (high): Robot "cover all projects" scope collapses into a global wildcard, conferring the deliberately-ungrantable robot:update — enabling cross-project robot takeover with owner lockout [GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xq2m-cj8w-56v5) in [`7331b58d5`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/7331b58d594f245aaf7f70515473aedffff85499)

### [high] Registry API administrator access now follows auth-proxy settings

- Affects: HTTP auth-proxy deployments using `auth_mode = http_auth`
- Additional action: `http_authproxy_admin_usernames` or `http_authproxy_admin_groups` entries for users or groups relying on Harbor UI administrator status for registry API access
- [GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw)

When an auth-proxy token used a username matching a local Harbor system administrator, including `admin`, `/v2/` requests could inherit administrator access even without admin rights from the proxy, allowing pulls, pushes, and deletes across projects. After the upgrade, a local Harbor administrator flag no longer grants administrator access to those requests; only the auth-proxy admin settings do.

> * (high): External auth-proxy identity named admin inherits Registry system-administrator authorization [GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xvh7-74g6-29xw) in [`13e5a1b97`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/13e5a1b979d90d346716c19eefc5f6cfa31dce0e)

### [high] Internal webhook and Slack delivery blocked by default

- Affects: Harbor setups where users who are not fully trusted can become project admins and jobservice can reach internal services or cloud metadata targeted by webhook or Slack notifications
- [GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w)

Before this release, a project admin could configure an HTTP or Slack webhook to an internal address; if jobservice could reach it and it returned an error, the response body was written to the webhook execution log. After upgrading, existing deliveries to internal endpoints fail and new ones are rejected by default; setting `network.allow_private_network_access: true` or `HARBOR_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_ACCESS` to `"true"` in both `core.extraEnvVars` and `jobservice.extraEnvVars` disables the protection, and should only be used if all project admins are trusted and `169.254.169.254` is blocked at the network level.

> > [!WARNING]
> > **Breaking change: webhooks to internal addresses are blocked by default**
> > The fix for [GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w) blocks webhook and Slack delivery to private, loopback, link-local and other non-public addresses. That includes hostnames that resolve to them, such as `*.svc.cluster.local`. After you upgrade, existing webhooks to internal endpoints fail to deliver, and new ones are rejected.
> > To allow them again, set the opt-out on **both core and jobservice**:
> > - `harbor.yml`: `network.allow_private_network_access: true`, then `./prepare` and restart
> > - Helm: add `{name: HARBOR_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_ACCESS, value: "true"}` to both `core.extraEnvVars` and `jobservice.extraEnvVars`
> > This disables the protection entirely. Only use it if you trust all project admins, and block `169.254.169.254` at the network level.
> * (medium): SSRF in webhook delivery allows ProjectAdmin to reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints [GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-2phj-cp9f-qq6w) in [`fb476e10c`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/fb476e10c9f981bd994011563bef6c5292ec272c)

### [high] Harbor administrator-flag changes restricted to system administrators

- Affects: system robot accounts with the `User: Update` permission
- [GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2)

When such a robot's token was held by someone or something not fully trusted, it could grant or remove system administrator status for any Harbor user. After the upgrade, those operations return HTTP 403, while the robot's other user-update operations remain unchanged.

> * (high): A system robot with user:update makes itself a system administrator [GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-w5fq-xrhj-j7g2) in [`8896be0ae`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/8896be0aed0dbbd2b59d1524b748b4699e823c39)

### [medium] Harbor removes User-Agent exemptions from image pull policies

- Affects: projects enforcing Content trust or Prevent vulnerable images from running
- [GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23)

Previously, users or robots with project push permission could use a `cosign` or `notation` `User-Agent` to pull images blocked by either policy. Those pulls are now blocked, so signing a new unsigned image in a Content trust project fails with `412 Precondition Failed`, while already-signed images remain pullable; `CONTENT_TRUST_LEGACY_SIGNER_PULL_ENABLED=true` restores the exemption only for Content trust and push-permitted users or robots.

> > [!WARNING]
> > **Breaking change: signing unsigned images fails when content trust is enforced**
> >
> > The fix for [GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23) removes the User-Agent based exemption that let `cosign` and `notation` pull unsigned images. In projects that only allow signed images, `cosign sign` and `notation sign` on a new, unsigned image now fail with `412 Precondition Failed`. Images that already have a signature are not affected.
> >
> > To allow signing clients again, set `CONTENT_TRUST_LEGACY_SIGNER_PULL_ENABLED=true` on **core**. The value must be exactly `true`.
> > - Helm: add it to `core.extraEnvVars`
> > - `harbor.yml` installs: there is no `harbor.yml` option. Add it to `common/config/core/env` and restart. Re-running `./prepare` overwrites that file.
> >
> > The exemption still trusts the client's User-Agent, but only for users or robots with push permission on the project. Projects that block vulnerable images have no opt-out: a signing client can no longer pull an image that the vulnerability policy blocks.
> * (medium): Vulnerability & Content-Trust pull policies bypassable via attacker-controlled `User-Agent` header [GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wrw5-gmvj-gf23) in [`9d255ebe1`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/9d255ebe1ad3cae00929af2f8100cec566d9ee97)

### [medium] Multi-selector immutable tag rules enforced correctly

- Affects: projects with immutable tag rules containing multiple repository or tag selectors
- [GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg)

These rules previously checked only the first pattern of each type, leaving tags matched by later selectors mutable and open to overwrite or deletion. Later matches are now protected, and pushes that overwrite them or attempts to delete them are rejected.

> * (medium): Immutable tag rule matcher only evaluates first repository/tag selector, allowing multi-selector rules to be bypassed [GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-27f2-qg57-2gwg) in [`08c58f3c7`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/08c58f3c76bd8e9252996a3cc62dade10d4e3ab4)

### [medium] Scanner credential filter exposure fixed

- Affects: Harbor installations with authenticated scanner registrations
- [GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr)

Repeated `q` filter queries could reveal the stored scanner credential one character at a time when an untrusted user could become a project admin; exposure also depended on whether the credential was recoverable as plain text. `access_cred` can no longer be used as a filter, and scanning behavior is unchanged.

> * (medium): scanner_registration.access_cred is missing filter:"false", giving a project admin a blind oracle over the scanner credential [GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvv-675v-p6rr) in [`d2e2312f5`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/d2e2312f5735777b37041674bb146bcbd02fc054)

### [medium] Scanner bearer-token requests now verify TLS and limit responses

- Affects: scan jobs using scanners with bearer authorization, when `core_url` is HTTPS and jobservice-to-core traffic crosses an untrusted network
- [GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4)

Previously, the token request skipped certificate checks, had no response-size limit or timeout, and could expose temporary scan credentials to interception or read an arbitrarily large response into memory. It now verifies core’s certificate, caps responses at 1 MiB, and times out after 30 seconds; an untrusted certificate can make scans fail with certificate errors.

> * (medium): Scanner bearer authorization request disables TLS verification and reads the full response body [GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-884q-mjcg-86x4) in [`eb1a6fb64`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/eb1a6fb6424d523213eeac1faffd938cc687f2af)

### [medium] Jobservice webhook error handling fixed

- Affects: Harbor installations using webhooks
- [GHSA-jw3v-7jvc-pfmx](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-jw3v-7jvc-pfmx)

When a webhook receiver returned an error, jobservice read and transparently decompressed the entire response body into the execution log without a size limit, potentially causing high memory use that delayed or failed jobs. It now discards at most 64 KiB of failed-response bodies and logs only the status code; redirects are not followed, so 3xx responses are recorded as failed deliveries.

> * (medium): Webhook error responses can cause unbounded decompression in Jobservice [GHSA-jw3v-7jvc-pfmx](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-jw3v-7jvc-pfmx) in [`fb476e10c`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/fb476e10c9f981bd994011563bef6c5292ec272c)

### [medium] Unsafe registry upload `Location`s rejected

- Affects: push-based replication to remote registries
- Additional action: For destinations that hand uploads off to another hostname, the configured endpoint URL must use that hostname.
- [GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6)

Before this release, Harbor used a remote registry’s upload `Location` without checking that it pointed back to the same registry, and sent blob data and the registry `Authorization` header there. Now, upload locations with a different scheme, host, or port, or with a username, are rejected and the replication task fails; relative locations still work.

> * (medium): Registry chunk upload reuses unvalidated Location headers [GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-wjpm-hv5w-gxr6) in [`401e73429`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/401e7342963c4c406fd103cf2931e8aac95d320d)

### [medium] Replication client rejects invalid pagination links

- Affects: pull-based replication from remote registries that paginate repository or tag lists
- Additional action: For remote registries whose pagination links use a different hostname, the Harbor endpoint URL must use that hostname.
- [GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2)

Previously, Harbor followed remote `Link` headers without checking their destination and sent stored registry credentials with the request. Now, a `next` link with a different scheme, host or port, or one containing a username, stops the listing with an error and fails replication.

> * (medium): SSRF and credential disclosure via attacker-controlled pagination Link header in the registry replication client [GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-xgp2-5vxg-rgh2) in [`a01e0c6c5`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/a01e0c6c561458fc719a16310d02b928a87e589a)

### Harbor security middleware now rejects requests when authentication-mode lookup fails

- Affects: Harbor core's configured authentication mode
- [GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6)

When core could not read the configured authentication mode, for example during a database or configuration cache outage, the middleware logged a warning and continued, leaving requests unauthenticated. Now those requests receive HTTP 500 (`failed to determine authentication mode`); normal requests are unchanged.

> * (low): Security middleware continues after AuthMode lookup failure [GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-3x7c-wf86-mjx6) in [`bfd319a92`](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/commit/bfd319a928460e50ad8f0536b5e163cefb24ef5c)

## Dependency updates (1)

1 more, none mentioning security

- `* fix: pin redis 7.2.11 instead of 7.2.6 in the redis base image by @bupd in https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/pull/24066`

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