# CRI-O v1.37.4

2026-11-16 · [Original release notes](https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/releases/tag/v1.37.4) · [Full summary](https://ratatosk.io/en/releases/cri-o/v1.37.4)

Security 3 (high 1) · Breaking changes 1 · Important fixes 2 · Dependency updates 4

## Security (3)

### [high] CRI-O linked log volume write vulnerability fixed

- Affects: Not stated in the release notes
- [CVE-2026-106096](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-106096), [GHSA-pw8r-75cr-c993](https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/security/advisories/GHSA-pw8r-75cr-c993)

A container could influence CRI-O or conmon writes to host files outside its log directory, compromising host-side integrity and potentially enabling root command execution if a targeted file was later executed. After the fix, containers see linked log volumes as read-only, including through kubelet `subPath` bind aliases, while CRI-O can still write from its host-side view; log collectors must keep offsets and buffers elsewhere.

Security advisory:

> When a container uses the opt-in `link-logs.crio.io` annotation, CRI-O exposes the pod's log directory through a pod-owned emptyDir and intends that view to be read-only. That isolation was not effective, so a container could alter host-side log state that CRI-O and conmon depend on. This gave the container a way to influence writes made by a privileged component against host files outside its own log directory, crossing the container-to-host integrity boundary; where such a file is later executed by the host, it can amount to command execution as root.
> The flaw exists since the feature's introduction in 1.28.0 and is reachable only when the annotation is enabled for the runtime handler; deployments that do not enable it are unaffected. Exploitation depends on pre-existing host state and remains subject to mandatory access control (MAC) policy, which places the attack complexity at high.
> The linked log volume is now mounted read-only in containers even when the container requests write access, including when the volume is reached through kubelet subPath bind aliases. The host-side view stays writable to CRI-O itself so that log linking and SELinux labeling keep working. Users should upgrade to one of:
> This is a behaviour change: log collectors must keep writable state such as offsets and buffers in a separate volume.
> - Do not enable `link-logs.crio.io` for any runtime handler. Deployments that leave it out of `allowed_annotations` are not reachable through a pod.
> - Run the containers of affected pods as an unprivileged UID that cannot become uid 0 (`runAsNonRoot`, no `setuid` escalation, no user-namespace mapping to host root). Kubelet creates the pod and container log directories under `/var/log/pods` as root-owned and not writable by group or other (0755), so such a container cannot create entries in the linked tree. This is conditional hardening: pods whose containers run as root, whether requested or inherited from the image, remain exposed.

https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/security/advisories/GHSA-pw8r-75cr-c993

### Go and `golang.org/x/net` resource-exhaustion flaws fixed

- Affects: Go standard-library `net/http` or `crypto/tls` code, or `golang.org/x/net/http2` (Inferred)
- [CVE-2026-78667](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-78667), [CVE-2026-78669](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-78669), [CVE-2026-97031](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-97031)

A malicious HTTP/2 peer could cause excessive CPU use with many streams and small SETTINGS frames, and parsing a Range header with many small ranges in `FileServer(FS)`, `ServeContent`, or `ServeFile(FS)` could also consume excessive CPU. A client packet with multiple ECH outer extension references could exhaust server memory; this release includes Go 1.27.2 and `golang.org/x/net` v0.60.0, and rejects malformed multiple ECH outer extension references.

> #### Dependency-Change
>  - Bumped Go to 1.27.2 and golang.org/x/net to v0.60.0, fixing CVE-2026-78669,
>   CVE-2026-78667, and CVE-2026-97031 (#10503, @amritansh1502)

### `golang.org/x/net` vulnerabilities fixed

- Affects: CRI-O builds that include `golang.org/x/net` (Inferred)
- [CVE-2026-78667](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-78667), [CVE-2026-78669](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-78669), [CVE-2026-97031](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-97031)

The previous version listed was v0.58.0; v0.60.0 is listed as fixing the vulnerabilities covered by this card.

> - golang.org/x/net: [v0.58.0 → v0.60.0](https://go.googlesource.com/net/+/acc78e0d2b2c855c0c4fbdcfe5f42a9e3d0f9778^1..18ece0ce30bc35fa81fe72028bf309bb3ff3f4a5/)

## Breaking changes (1)

### CRI-O shutdown deadlock fixed

- Affects: CNI readiness waits during CRI-O shutdown

During node shutdown, in-flight RPCs blocked on CNI readiness could leave CRI-O ignoring `SIGTERM` and deadlocked. These waits now return on context cancellation; CRI-O shuts down the CNI manager before gracefully stopping gRPC, and forces the gRPC server to stop if graceful stopping takes 30 seconds.

>  - Fixed a deadlock where CRI-O ignored SIGTERM when in-flight RPCs were blocked waiting for CNI readiness during node shutdown. The CNI manager is now shut down before the gRPC server stops, and a forced stop is scheduled as a fallback after 30 seconds. (#10473, @openshift-cherrypick-robot)

## Important fixes (2)

### CRI-O cleanup for dropped infra containers fixed

- Affects: Pods with a `RuntimeClass` whose dropped infra container's runtime handler is no longer in CRI-O's configuration

Previously, CRI-O could fail to resolve the recorded handler, leaving the pod unable to stop or remove. It now falls back to the default runtime handler so the pod can be stopped and removed.

>  - Fixed pods with a RuntimeClass and a dropped infra container running on the default runtime handler.

### User-namespace OOM score adjustment handling fixed

- Affects: CRI-O instances running in a user namespace

When an infra or Guaranteed pod container requested an OOM score adjustment below the user-namespace minimum, the OCI runtime could fail to create it. CRI-O now uses the minimum for creation while container status reports the requested value in the `RequestedOOMScoreAdj` annotation.

>   Fixed creating infra and Guaranteed pod containers when CRI-O runs in a user namespace. (#10523, @openshift-cherrypick-robot)

## Dependency updates (4)

4 more, none mentioning security

- `- golang.org/x/crypto: [v0.55.0 → v0.57.0](https://go.googlesource.com/crypto/+/f44d03d253a1503e51b059ca880867c51d878242^1..3f62bf119e84c6e35e8518a2958089ade622d1a3/)`
- `- golang.org/x/mod: [v0.39.0 → v0.41.0](https://go.googlesource.com/mod/+/13be9020bbbfae457b59b82c999f8c309cb21ffc^1..d0a27b2d4a48460806692bf5c87fc157c3c65292/)`
- `- golang.org/x/term: [v0.45.0 → v0.46.0](https://go.googlesource.com/term/+/9f69229da31ca6a34b522f59dbe07cad5ea21587^1..6226200ed12cba417a9d9e799c2a7179d3fc0e27/)`
- `- golang.org/x/text: [v0.41.0 → v0.42.0](https://go.googlesource.com/text/+/acdba6655fd45cdb5ab73c9d6a8981333bd65a39^1..fafe4a06967e06550e69ee42787d9902845d2a3f/)`

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