# CRI-O v1.34.12

2026-08-24 · [Original release notes](https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/releases/tag/v1.34.12) · [Full summary](https://ratatosk.io/en/releases/cri-o/v1.34.12)

Security 3 (critical 1 · high 1) · Important fixes 1

## Security (3)

### [critical] CRI-O sandbox state poisoning fixed

- Affects: Not stated in the release notes
- Additional action: All running containers on the nodes wiped during the CRI-O upgrade
- [CVE-2026-62146](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-62146), [GHSA-6wmc-5877-hgc9](https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/security/advisories/GHSA-6wmc-5877-hgc9)

An attacker who could create a Pod with arbitrary annotations could poison persisted sandbox state. After a CRI-O restart or node reboot, containers recreated in the affected sandbox could mount attacker-controlled host paths, potentially exposing the CRI-O socket and enabling container escape.

Security advisory:

> A user who can create a Pod with arbitrary annotations can poison persisted CRI-O sandbox state. After a CRI-O restart or node reboot, containers recreated in the affected sandbox may mount attacker-controlled host paths, potentially exposing the CRI-O socket and enabling container escape.
> The users must wipe all running containers on the nodes when upgrading CRI-O
> Admission webhook rejecting Pod annotations and labels with the io.kubernetes.cri-o. prefix. For example, a validating webhook that denies any Pod whose metadata.annotations or metadata.labels contain keys starting with io.kubernetes.cri-o.

https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/security/advisories/GHSA-6wmc-5877-hgc9

Security advisory:

> CRI-O sandbox state poisoning after restart can expose crio.sock

https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/security/advisories/GHSA-6wmc-5877-hgc9

### [high] CRI-O `HOME` newline injection bypass fixed

- Affects: container `HOME` environment variables
- [CVE-2022-4318](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-4318), [CVE-2026-15809](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-15809), [GHSA-9gq4-2485-q63q](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9gq4-2485-q63q)

When an attacker able to set a container's environment put an actual newline in `HOME`, the check matched only the literal characters `\n`, allowing arbitrary lines to be added to `/etc/passwd`. CRI-O now rejects `HOME` values containing actual newline or carriage-return bytes with an error; values without those bytes are not rejected by this check.

> #### Uncategorized
>  - Fixed CVE-2026-15809: bypass of CVE-2022-4318 fix allowing /etc/passwd injection via newline characters in the HOME environment variable. The original check incorrectly matched the literal string "\n" instead of actual newline bytes. (#10217, @aksjadha)

### [medium] CRI-O daemon crash from malformed OCI image entries fixed

- Affects: Not stated in the release notes
- [CVE-2026-17113](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-17113), [GHSA-v5pw-cc82-qrf6](https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/security/advisories/GHSA-v5pw-cc82-qrf6)

A crafted OCI image with an environment entry missing `=` could crash the daemon when the container spec had no environment variables. This release prevents that crash.

Security advisory:

> A crafted OCI image with a malformed environment variable entry can crash the CRI-O daemon.
> This only occurs when no environment variables are set in the container spec. In standard Kubernetes deployments, the kubelet always injects default environment variables, so this issue is not triggered through the normal Kubernetes API path. Environments where containers are created without default environment variables, such as direct CRI API callers, may be affected.
> - Use a standard Kubernetes setup where the kubelet manages container lifecycle. The kubelet always injects default environment variables, which prevents this issue from being triggered.
> - Restrict container images to trusted registries using admission controllers (e.g. Kyverno, OPA/Gatekeeper).
> - Validate OCI image configurations before publishing, rejecting any image whose config.Env contains entries without a = delimiter.

https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/security/advisories/GHSA-v5pw-cc82-qrf6

Security advisory:

> Denial of Service (DoS) — CRI-O daemon crash via crafted OCI image.

https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/security/advisories/GHSA-v5pw-cc82-qrf6

## Important fixes (1)

### User namespace mappings restored at CRI-O startup

- Affects: containers using user namespaces with ID-mapped mounts

Before this fix, these containers could fail with “permission denied” after a CRI-O restart or when the real container process was killed with `kill 1`, because their namespace mappings were not loaded. The restored mappings prevent these failures.

>  - User namespace UID/GID mappings are now correctly restored after CRI-O restart, fixing "permission denied" errors for containers using user namespaces with ID-mapped mounts. (#10231, @Chandan9112)

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